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Abstract
This article explores the importance and impact of a set of actions through which bak-
ers manipulate laws and regulations that seek to organize and regulate how they do 
business. It builds on eighteen months of fieldwork conducted in Jordan, twelve of 
which were spent working in three different bakeries in the capital, Amman. Moving 
away from the idea that public policies are simply imposed, the article looks in detail 
at the social relations through which they are enacted. By honing in on the bakery, and 
examining arrangements between bakery owners, workers, consumers and ministerial 
employees, it illuminates modes of political agency that escape conventional binaries 
of domination/resistance, state/society and legality/illegality. I argue against seeing 
these practices as easily categorized forms of resistance or frivolous acts of corruption. 
Nor are they simply reinforcements of hegemonic control. Instead, ‘tactics’ at the bak-
ery subvert the order of things to serve other ends. Foregrounding them in this analysis 
seeks not only to challenge views of power relations as strictly binary but to elucidate 
some of the ways in which citizens inhabit and engage with the neoliberal and authori-
tarian logics that pervade everyday life in Jordan.
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At four-thirty in the morning, Hani ambles down the hill from his house in Jabal 
B, a poor neighborhood in East Amman.1 A five-minute walk takes him to his 
bakery. He turns on the lights, takes a quick glance at some paperwork, jump-
starts the flour mixer and fires up the oven. By five, his workers have joined 
him. They drop their coats and belongings in the backroom and begin the day’s 
labor. One works the flour mixer, two prepare dough and three bake bread and 
ready it for sale. The same six men will work until nine at night, in two shifts 
interspersed by a two-hour lunch break. Hani spends most of the day at the 
cash register chain smoking. From his perch, he barks orders at the workers, 
greets customers amicably and sorts out the minutiae that make the business 
run: salt procurement, payment of electricity bills, taxation matters and the 
purchase of subsidized flour. It is the last of these tasks that consumes most of 
his time and causes the majority of his unease. The Ministry of Industry, Trade 
and Supply (moits) closely regulates the subsidized bread business. moits 
intervenes in all steps of the supply chain: it purchases wheat on international 
markets, oversees the production and delivery of discounted flour and regu-
lates the price of subsidized bread sold to consumers. Bakeries both big and 
small such as Hani’s are given flour quotas which must, by law, be used exclu-
sively for the production of standard khubz ‘arabī (Arab—or pita—bread) that 
is sold at 0.16 jd (0.23 usd) per kilogram.2 Ministry employees set these quotas, 
which guarantee a 7% profit for bakers, through a complex and confidential 
formula based on a bakery’s potential output, the owner’s reputation and lo-
cal demand. Once set, the quotas are very hard to change, especially when an 
increase is requested. moits employees, distraught by a thriving black market 
that drains government coffers, suspect bakery owners may re-sell their dis-
counted flour or use it to make sweets, cakes and fancier varieties of bread, two 
common practices that are legally prohibited.
Three bakeries operate in Jabal B. One is smaller than Hani’s, with just two 
employees. Another closes at 3 in the afternoon, following the lunch rush. For 
local residents, many of whom work in the wealthier neighborhoods of West 
Amman, Hani’s outlet is the last place where they can buy bread for dinner. 
For others, it is the easiest place to obtain provisions for an early breakfast. The 
bakery’s proximity to the neighborhood mosque as well as its long opening 
hours contributes to its popularity. Hani sells only subsidized khubz ‘arabī. He 
prefers not to prepare other, non-subsidized wheat-based products from which 
other bakeries derive most of their profits. His business practices target the 
1 In order to preserve the anonymity of my informants and interviewees, whose ostensibly 
illegal activities I will describe herein, I have used pseudonyms for people and unspecified 
designations for the districts in which I conducted fieldwork: Jabal B and Jabal C.
2 As of February 2018, this price has been increased.
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local customer base: “Most families in this neighborhood are very poor. They 
may eat lamb or chicken once a week, they buy sweets in the balad (down-
town) for holidays, but they eat bread with almost every meal,” he reasons. 
Since 2012, Jabal B has witnessed a sizeable influx of Syrian refugees, attracted 
by cheap rents and the neighborhood’s proximity to a major public transporta-
tion hub.3 Hani estimates that his customer base has grown by 15,000 people, 
yet his bakery has not been given a commensurate increase in its flour quota. 
This does not endanger his business—profits on subsidized bread sold from 
his quota remain steady at 7%—but it does threaten the routines, rhythms and 
subsistence of his customers; under his current flour quota subsidized bread 
provisions would be depleted by three or four in the afternoon, he estimates. 
Faced with this conundrum, Hani commits a crime. Once a week, he meets a 
ministerial employee and pays him a bribe that ensures supplementary deliv-
eries of subsidized flour. Although arrangements such as these are frequently 
described as ‘corruption’ or a ‘failure of governance,’ they are better understood 
as ‘tactics’ that shape livelihoods in the city of Amman.
This article is based on a study of the Jordanian bread subsidy. It builds on 
eighteen months of fieldwork conducted in the country, twelve of which were 
spent working in three different bakeries in the capital, Amman.4 Here, I will 
explore the importance and impact of a set of actions through which bakers 
manipulate laws and regulations that seek to organize how they do business. A 
close study of the arrangements amongst bakery owners, workers, consumers 
and ministerial employees seeks to illuminate modes of political agency that 
escape conventional binaries of domination/resistance, state/society and le-
gality/illegality that dominate the literature in comparative politics. I identify 
and analyze such arrangements by honing in on place. Specifically, this article 
examines the bakery as a salient sphere of everyday life, a crucial site in which 
state power, urban livelihoods and creative tactics intersect. Neither a hermeti-
cally sealed biophysical reality nor autonomous site of the subaltern, the bak-
ery is a politically charged assemblage that is simultaneously conceived, lived 
and imagined.5 By conceptualizing place in this fashion, the article seeks to 
3 For more on how welfare provision in Jordan intersects with emergency aid for Syrian refu-
gees, see José Ciro Martínez, “Bread is Life: The Intersection of Welfare Politics and Emer-
gency Aid in Jordan,” Middle East Report, 44:272 (2014): 30–35.
4 During this time, I regularly participated in daily ‘office’ routines, usually during the early 
morning or late afternoon hours and always with the permission of bakery owners.
5 What, in Lefebvrian terms, would amount to l’espace conçu, véçu and perçu. For more on 
Lefebvre’s “tantalizingly vague” triad, see Andrew Merrifield, “Place and Space: A Lefebvrian 
Reconciliation,” Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers, 18:4 (1993): 516–531.
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assess the constellation of situated everyday practices through which citizens 
navigate crosscutting fields of power. I argue against seeing these practices as 
easily categorized forms of resistance or frivolous acts of corruption or con-
sumerism. Nor are they simply reinforcements of hegemonic control. Through 
the art of trickery, disruption and ingenuity, ‘tactics’ at the bakery subvert the 
order of things to serve other ends. Although the politics of these actions may 
be unclear, their tactical nature is both recognizable and effective. Foreground-
ing them in this analysis seeks not only to problematize prevalent dichotomies 
but to illuminate some of the ways in which citizens inhabit and engage with 
the neoliberal and authoritarian logics that pervade everyday life in Jordan.
 (Dis)Locating Grids of Rule
In the process of providing bread to its citizens, the Jordanian state must cal-
culate and rationalize that which it distributes and those who receive it. To 
render this arena of intervention both technical and improvable, humans and 
things must be bounded, mapped, characterized and documented.6 Foucault 
terms the broader process in which such developments are enmeshed as the 
“governmentalization of the state”7—“the process by which the juridical and 
administrative apparatus of the polity come to incorporate the disparate are-
nas of rule concerned with the government of the population.”8 In Jordan as 
elsewhere, reference grids, censuses, and surveys seek to construct an abstract 
field of observation through which the governmental gaze can assess accurate 
information and travel without impediment.9 These “inscription devices”10 
make information both knowable and quantifiable, they “render visible the 
space over which government is to be exercised.”11 By reducing the messiness 
of place and practice through standards and codifications, labels and texts, 
6 Tania Murray Li, The Will to Improve: Governmentality, Development, and the Practice of 
Politics (Durham, nc: Duke University Press, 2007), 126.
7 Michel Foucault, “Governmentality,” in The Foucault Effect, ed. Graham Burchell, Colin 
Gordon and Peter Miller (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991), 103.
8 Mitchell Dean, Governmentality: Power and Rule in Modern Society (Sage: London, 1999), 2.
9  Matthew G. Hannah, Governmentality and the Mastery of Territory in Nineteenth-Century 
America (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 124; James C. Scott, Seeing like a 
State: How Certain Schemes to Improve the Human Condition Have Failed (New Haven: Yale 
University Press, 1998).
10  Bruno Latour, “The Powers of Association,” The Sociological Review, 32:S1 (1984): 264–280.
11 Nikolas Rose, Powers of Freedom: Reframing Political Thought (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1999), 36.
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state actors can define problems, measure resources and specify sectors for 
intervention.12 Yet the success of such efforts is far from certain. Forms of 
knowledge and technique are not the sole source of these failures; there are 
many reasons for such ruptures.13 Here I want to focus on the severe limits 
on governmental programs posed by their target—the dynamic forces of so-
cial life. Whether it be humans, things, environment or space, this “obdurate 
terrain” presents important constraints on that which governmental interven-
tions seek to accomplish.14 Discrepancies between ambitions and outcomes 
traverse landscapes of rule; intended outcomes are never guaranteed.
Henri Lefebvre’s insights on the production of abstract space are productive 
for examining such discrepancies. His work considerably expanded the scope 
of Marxist sociology, and served to put the production of space at the fore-
front of considerations of capitalism and state power. Lefebvre posits that dur-
ing the transition to capitalist modernity, the state apparatus produces a new 
form of socio-spatial organization, one characterized by its “ ‘abstract’ quality.” 
He terms this “abstract space,” a conceptualization that sees space as a solid, 
measurable substance, “an objectified, reified thing” (italics in original).15 Plan-
ners, engineers, developers and technocrats of all colors are crucial to abstract 
space’s circulation. It entails the classification and partitioning of political-
economic life into clearly delineated jurisdictions that can be regulated and 
controlled. By codifying space into legible grids, characterized by fixity and ho-
mogeneity, abstract space attempts to inscribe ‘rational’ economic calculation 
in the spheres of production and exchange, as well as comprehensive control 
in the realm of statecraft.16 Such dynamics can be seen in the Jordanian gov-
ernment’s bread subsidy.
12 Peter Burke, Social History of Knowledge: From Gutenberg to Diderot (Cambridge: Polity 
Press, 2000); Thomas Lemke, Foucault, Governmentality and Critique (Boulder: Paradigm 
Publishers, 2011).
13 Thomas Biebricher, “Critical Theories of the State: Governmentality and the Strategic-
Relational Approach,” Constellations, 20:3 (2013): 388–405.
14 Tanya Murray Li, “Governmentality,” Anthropologica, 49:2 (2007): 277. Foucault similarly 
emphasizes how life constantly escapes integration into the techniques of power that 
attempt to govern it. Michel Foucault, The History of Sexuality. An Introduction. Volume 1 
(New York: Vintage Books, 1990), 143.
15 Daniel Neep, “State-Space beyond Territory: Wormholes, Gravitational Fields, and Entan-
glement,” Journal of Historical Sociology 30.3 (2017): 475.
16 Henri Lefebvre, The Production of Space, trans. Donald Nicholson-Smith (Oxford: Black-
wel, 1991), 370. Neil Brenner and Stuart Elden, “Henri Lefebvre on State, Space, Territory,” 
International Political Sociology, 3:4 (2009): 358.
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The Ministry of Industry, Trade and Supply (moits), which is charged with 
running the welfare program, seeks to organize, manage, standardize and con-
trol all aspects of the subsidized bread business. It fixes the country’s yearly 
wheat consumption, regulates the production of millers, supervises flour 
deliveries, sets profit margins for production and determines the nutritional 
needs of every single one of the country’s neighborhoods. It then uses this in-
formation to issue licenses to bakers, and establish their allocation of subsi-
dized flour. Routine inspections of sanitary conditions, flour extraction rates 
and bread quality seek to ensure that regulations are observed and that stan-
dard khubz ‘arabī is sold at the price of sixteen qirsh per kilogram. These efforts 
are more than public health or welfare monitoring measures. By constructing a 
governable grid out of complex irregularities, histories and practices, moits’s 
meticulous set of calculating practices, procedures and techniques seek to re-
inforce the state’s logic of socio-spatial control over humans and things.17 Lefe-
bvre was hardly a proponent of this shift. He remained sharply critical of the 
technocratic and apolitical veneer through which abstract space was deployed 
and circulated, always emphasizing the inherently political nature of spatial 
organization. Crucially, Lefebvre’s analysis suggests that projects of state ra-
tionalization are not only fragmentary but also contested.18 Whereas the state 
apparatus attempts to remake space into ordered diagrams and governable 
grids, diverse social actors strive to create, preserve and expand places of social 
reproduction and grassroots control.19 The deployment of regulatory strategies 
does not necessarily imply their ultimate triumph. And it is the spontaneity 
of everyday life that remains a primary arena for prospective disruption, “the 
starting point for the realization of the possible.”20
 Practice and Politics in Everyday Life
Michel de Certeau’s work shares with Lefebvre an enduring interest in the ev-
eryday. While from a far different philosophical tradition, his examination of 
17 Empirical studies have shown the variety of administrative, legal and technical practices 
that permit the state apparatus to construct and disseminate abstract space. For an excel-
lent summary, see Neep, “State Space Beyond Territory.”
18 Though cast through a familiar resistance/domination dichotomy, Lefebvre’ Production of 
Space (1991) makes clear how everyday life is imbued with power, never neatly responding 
to the ordered diagrams and static distributions of the state apparatus.
19  Elden and Brenner, “Henri Lefebvre,” 367.
20  Henri Lefebvre, as quoted in Andrew Merrifield, Henri Lefebvre: A Critical Introduction 
(New York: Routledge, 2006), 10.
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routine practices seeks to illustrate how users of space creatively manipulate 
mechanisms of discipline and homogenization. In The Practice of Everyday 
Life, de Certeau dissects the ways in which subjects of power play with the 
social order by using the very products and tools that order imposes on them, 
neither submitting to the demands of hegemonic forces nor confronting them 
head on. He conceptualizes the varied practices through which citizens and 
users reappropriate spaces organized and imposed by techniques of power as 
“tactics.”21 In so doing, he extends the domain of politics beyond formal in-
stitutions and collective mobilization to the diverse ways of operating within 
“the practice of everyday life.”22 Yet crucially, de Certeau’s story is not one of 
revolution or grand upheaval, but of stubbornness, obstinacy and creativity. 
Throughout his work, he stresses the innumerable constraints and the con-
fined objectives of everyday practices. When “order is tricked by an art,” it is 
often done without any illusion that this order will change any time soon: “it 
is a maneuver ‘within an enemy’s field of vision’ and within enemy territory.”23 
Bereft of the means to challenge a social order, tactics may deflect power or re-
direct its strictures, but always without leaving its field of operation.
Although a corpus of research on the politics of everyday life, largely inspired 
by James Scott,24 has drawn our attention to the various mechanisms through 
which subaltern and working classes engage with their socio- economic cir-
cumstances, these works far too frequently rely on dichotomous categories of 
domination and resistance. In the Middle East, everyday practices amongst 
popular classes have frequently been portrayed as defensive coping mecha-
nisms or contentious acts of defiance that function as the building blocks of 
collective mobilization.25 The recent Arab uprisings do seem to indicate that 
21 Michel de Certeau, The Practice of Everyday Life (Berkeley: University of California Press, 
1984), xiv. For useful accounts of the difference between strategy and tactics, see Ian Bu-
chanan, Michel de Certeau: Cultural Theorist (London: Sage, 2000), 86–108; Ben Highmore, 
Everyday Life and Cultural Theory: An Introduction (New York: Routledge, 2002), 145–174.
22 de Certeau, The Practice of Everyday Life, xxiv; Donald S. Moore, “Subaltern Struggles and 
the Politics of Place: Remapping Resistance in Zimbabwe’s Eastern Highlands,” Cultural 
Anthropology, 13:3 (1998): 350.
23 de Certeau, The Practice of Everyday Life, 26 and 37.
24 James C. Scott, Weapons of the Weak: Everyday Forms of Resistance (New Haven: Yale Uni-
versity Press, 1985); James C. Scott, Domination and the Arts of Resistance: Hidden Tran-
scripts (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1990).
25 Reinoud Leenders and Steven Heydemann, “Popular Mobilization in Syria: Opportunity 
and Threat, and the Social Networks of the Early Risers,” Mediterranean Politics 17:2 (2012): 
139–159; Charles Tripp, The Power and the People: Paths of Resistance in the Middle East 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013); Sophie Richter-Devroe (2011) “Palestin-
ian Women’s Everyday Resistance: Between Normality and Normalisation,” Journal of 
 International Women’s Studies, 12:2 (2011): 32–46; Salwa Ismail, “Urban Subalterns in the 
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these practices may have the potential to “become infrastructures of action—
foundations upon which resistance in the form of collective action can be 
built,”26 but their importance is not exhausted by such possibilities. Time in 
the field allowed me to observe seemingly mundane actions that both express 
dissent but also employ calculated accommodation, that seek autonomy from 
oppressive governmental regulations while also demanding support from a 
beneficent state. They are neither revolutionary nor an indication of passivity. 
Of course, opposition and subversion are involved, but so are improvisation, 
negotiation with authorities and forms of “quiet encroachment”27 through 
which ordinary people attempt to improve their lives.28 By highlighting the 
routines, contestations and social relations in which these everyday practices 
are enmeshed, I seek to attend to the various ways in which citizens navigate 
the warrens of capitalist exchange and the grids of authoritarian rule, without 
succumbing to the “romance of resistance”29 or sanitizing the politics of sub-
alterns.30 Melding Lefebvre’s meditations on abstract space with de Certeau’s 
notion of tactics, and drawing upon their shared concern with the everyday, I 
contend that, at the bakery, Jordanians encounter and confound the state ap-
paratus’ regulatory techniques while establishing alternative modes of togeth-
erness and consumption that make precarity livable.31
 Situating Tactics
Prior to the onset of structural adjustment measures in 1989, social welfare 
in Jordan was composed of an aggregate of public policies common to many 
Arab Revolutions: Cairo and Damascus in Comparative Perspective,” Comparative Studies 
in Society and History 55:4 (2013): 865–894.
26 Salwa Ismail, Political Life in Cairo's New Quarters: Encountering the Everyday State (Min-
neapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2006), xxiii.
27 Asef Bayat, Life as Politics: How Ordinary People Change the Middle East (Palo Alto: Stan-
ford University Press, 2010).
28 Jonathan Shapiro Anjaria, The Slow Boil: Street Food, Rights and Public Space in Mumbai 
(Palo Alto: Stanford University Press, 2016), 105.
29  Lila Abu-Lughod, “The Romance of Resistance: Tracing Transformations of Power through 
Bedouin Women,” American Ethnologist, 17:1 (1990): 41–55.
30  Sherry B. Ortner, “Resistance and the Problem of Ethnographic Refusal,” Comparative 
Studies in Society and History, 37:1 (1995): 173–193.
31 Judith Butler, Notes Toward a Performative Theory of Assembly (Cambridge: Harvard Uni-
versity Press, 2015), 218; Amira Mittermaier, “Bread, Freedom, Social Justice: The Egyptian 
Uprising and a Sufi Khidma,” Cultural Anthropology, 29:1 (2014): 54–79; Laleh Khalili, “The 
Politics of Pleasure: Promenading on the Corniche and Beachgoing,” Environment and 
Planning D: Society and Space 34.4 (2016): 583–600.
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“protective welfare states.”32 A curious fusion of Keynesian techniques em-
ployed for conservative ends, the system sought to acquiesce both labor and 
business while bolstering the Hashemite regime’s legitimacy. Generous public 
employment for East Bankers and universal consumer protections in the form 
of price supports and subsidies worked to shield families from labor market 
risk and economic downturns, all while lowering labor costs.33 These policies 
expanded substantially during the late 1970s. In addition to salary increases, 
government employees were given access to credit, health insurance and gen-
erous pensions. The population as a whole had access to basic commodities 
administered and regulated by the Ministry of Supply, formally established in 
1974. Subsidized goods included: wheat, sugar, petroleum, powdered milk, tea, 
cigarettes and coffee. Over the next two decades, access to geopolitical and 
oil rents coupled with the Hashemite regime’s patrimonial tendencies led the 
state apparatus to become the main provider of crucial subsistence goods for 
many citizens. Although the country’s embrace of interventionist measures 
was not inspired by a coherent development model or Arab socialist ideology 
as in Egypt and Syria, welfare policies were slowly woven into a complex field 
of informal expectations amongst Jordanians who, criticisms notwithstanding, 
frequently refer to this period (1972–1988) as one characterized by job guaran-
tees, access to affordable education and relative social equality.
The shift towards neoliberal economic policies engendered by the country’s 
debt crisis and the subsequent implementation of structural adjustment poli-
cies decreased welfare expenditures. Beginning in 1989, hiring in the public 
sector declined, except for the armed forces, and subsidies on most goods were 
eliminated. Price increases levied on fuel, residential water and various food-
stuffs were enacted just as civil service pay was frozen,34 making it increasingly 
difficult for government employees to deal with inflation, which was rising by 
30 to 50 percent at the time.35 Spending reductions in other social programs 
resulted in reduced access to education, health care, and affordable housing. 
These changes did not occur without social unrest or vociferous public pro-
tests. Increases in fuel prices in 1989 sparked immediate riots in the southern 
city of Ma‘an, which quickly spread throughout the country. The removal of 
bread subsidies in 1996 ignited unrest in Karak, a town once considered a 
32 For more on protective welfare states, see Nita Rudra, “Welfare States in Developing 
Countries: Unique or Universal?” Journal of Politics, 69:2 (2007): 378–396.
33 Anne Marie Baylouny, Privatizing Welfare in the Middle East: Kin Mutual Aid Associations 
in Jordan and Lebanon (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2010), 168.
34 “Jordan: New Government,” Oxford Analytica Daily Brief, 2 May 1989.
35 Baylouny, Privatizing Welfare, 55.
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 bastion of monarchical support.36 Those who fought to defend the provision-
ist status quo ante in the face of austerity measures imposed from above were 
able to extract occasional concessions.37 Protestors and opposition parties set 
their critiques within the confines of established values and ideologies of the 
ruling order, which made them very hard to disavow.38 These forms of “rightful 
resistance”39 won key victories, including increased participation in ostensibly 
democratic forums, discounted heating oil and the preservation of wheat and 
barley subsidies.
Despite these sporadic victories, the last two decades have negatively altered 
the living standards of Jordan’s poor and middle classes. Far from shielding 
them from the worst effects of austerity by way of private sector jobs, new busi-
ness opportunities and access to financial tools, neoliberalization has wors-
ened their plight.40 In the midst of booming service, construction and military 
sectors, inequality and poverty levels have worsened. Although official wages 
might be growing, employment is uncertain, and while taxes are compara-
tively modest, they remain regressive. The privatization of public companies, 
de-regulation of markets and implementation of free trade agreements have 
undoubtedly created new opportunities, but these have mainly benefitted a 
coterie of elites with close ties to the Palace.41 Within this context of increasing 
inequality, social policy has seen a shift towards targeted anti-poverty schemes 
and cash transfers championed by international financial institutions.  Initiated 
36 Curtis Ryan, “Peace, Bread and Riots: Jordan and the International Monetary Fund,” Mid-
dle East Policy, 6:2 (1998): 54–66.
37 John Chalcraft, Popular Politics in the Making of the Modern Middle East (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2016), 532; Larbi Sadiki, “Popular Uprisings and Arab Democ-
ratization,” International Journal Middle East Studies, 32:1 (2000): 71–95.
38 José Ciro Martínez, “Leavened Apprehensions: Bread Subsidies and Moral Economies in 
Hashemite Jordan,” International Journal of Middle East Studies 50:2 (2018): 173–193; José 
Ciro Martínez, “Jordan’s Self-fulfilling Prophecy: The Production of Feeble Political Par-
ties and the Perceived Perils of Democracy,” British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies 44.3 
(2017): 356–372.
39  Kevin J. O'Brien and Lianjiang Li, Rightful Resistance in Rural China (Cambridge: 
 Cambridge University Press, 2006).
40  Najib B. Hourani (2014) “Neoliberal Urbanism and the Arab Uprisings: A View from Am-
man,” Journal of Urban Affairs, 36:s2 (2014): 650–662; Eliana Abu-Hani, “Neoliberalism as 
a Site-Specific Process: The Aesthetics and Politics of Architecture in Amman, Jordan,” 
Cities, 60:A (2017): 102–112.
41 Anne Mariel Peters and Pete W. Moore, “Beyond Boom and Bust: External Rents,  Durable 
Authoritarianism, and Institutional Adaptation in the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan,” 
Studies in Comparative International Development 44:3 (2009): 256–285; Abu-Hani, 
 “Neoliberalism as a Site-Specific Process,” 102–112.
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during the early 1990s, these programs have expanded under King Abdullah ii. 
Inadequately funded and administratively disjointed, observers have criticized 
these programs for their inability to reach all those in need, or to provide any-
thing beyond basic assistance to the approximately 20 percent of the poor they 
successfully reach.42 The re-structuring of the country’s welfare system paid 
little heed to the exigencies of its labor market, which is highly dependent on a 
service sector in which employment is seasonal, intermittent, and, quite often, 
informal.43 As a result, poor, working and middle-class sectors of society not 
connected to the military have been left to cobble together social welfare from 
ngos, charities and kin mutual aid associations.
One key consequence of this reconfiguration is the increased vulnerability 
of poor and working classes to inflation and increases in the prices of subsis-
tence goods. As Asef Bayat argues, this has caused a shift in popular needs 
and demands, not just in Jordan but also throughout the Middle East.44 Past 
struggles over wages and working conditions, the typical demands of trade 
unionism, have lost ground in favor of broader concerns related to issues of 
urban collective consumption—housing, electricity, water and food. Subsi-
dized bread lies at the intersection of these developments. It is one of the few 
Jordanian welfare programs that have survived the erosion of social provisions 
that characterized the pre-austerity social contract and continues to represent 
a crucial hedge against inflation and volatile food markets for residents of the 
country. Yet the foodstuff ’s importance transcends its financial value or nu-
tritional properties; it is a cornerstone of urban and rural diets, a subsistence 
good through which feelings of groupness and community are (re) produced.45 
Similar to corn in Mexico or the baguette in France, khubz ‘arabī serves “as a 
centerpiece of daily ritual and social interaction,”46 one that lies “at the core of 
both the material and symbolic organization of everyday existence.”47
Broadly popular and consistently defended, the bread subsidy also under-
girds one of the most consequential and recurring encounters of ordinary 
42 Baylouny, Privatizing Welfare, 75–78.
43 Baylouny, Privatizing Welfare, 78.
44 Asef Bayat, “Activism and Social Development in the Middle East,” International Journal 
of Middle East Studies 34:1 (2002): 1–28.
45 Wendy Wolford, “Families, Fields, and Fighting for Land: The Spatial Dynamics of Con-
tention in Rural Brazil,” Mobilization, 8:2 (2003): 157–172; Erica Simmons, Meaningful 
Resistance: Market Reforms and the Roots of Social Protest in Latin America (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2016).
46 Simmons, Meaningful Resistance, 9.
47 Steven L. Kaplan, The Bakers of Paris and the Bread Question, 1700–1755 (Durham, nc: Duke 
University Press, 1996).
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 citizens with the state apparatus—which seeks to meticulously control the 
production, distribution and consumption of khubz ‘arabī. Yet this very mo-
nopoly periodically engenders inequitable outcomes, including neighbor-
hoods where demand outstrips supply or vice versa.48 In response, bakers and 
ordinary citizens employ various tactics so as to guarantee provision and en-
sure subsistence. Notwithstanding laws, regulations, sporadic edicts and rou-
tine inspections through which the bread subsidy is enacted, state strategies of 
regulation continuously produce their “own defiant outside.”49
 Jabal B: Bribing for Subsistence
Apart from Fridays, when the bakery opens after the weekly prayer, the routine 
at Hani’s locale is unwavering. Lunch plans vary, friends or spouses occasional-
ly come by for brief conversation, fortnightly government inspections trigger a 
brief stoppage but during work hours, habits rarely fluctuate. Except for Satur-
days between four and five in the afternoon. At this time, an acquaintance that 
I initially did not recognize arrives without fail. During my first weeks working 
at Hani’s, his weekly stopover caused an unease I could not grasp. Around thir-
ty minutes before his expected arrival, Hani would take the old cigarette carton 
that functioned as the cash register into the backroom. He would emerge edgy 
and apprehensive, pace around nervously until the visitor appeared. The visi-
tor skillfully managed the entire episode. He came in quietly, nodded at Hani, 
spent a few minutes whispering with him out of earshot in the backroom be-
fore walking briskly out of sight. In less than five minutes he was gone, folded 
bills tucked eagerly into his pocket.
Fahed was one of three moits employees charged with overseeing bakeries 
in East Amman. Following his fifth Saturday visit, I realized who he was, his 
casual dishdasha (kaftan) a stark contrast to his workweek attire of slacks and 
a buttoned down shirt. I had seen him during the routine inspections moits 
staff undertook at the bakery twice a month. After two months at Hani’s, I de-
cided to ask the workers about the purpose of his visit. “Fasād (corruption),” 
48 For one recurring example, see Dana Al Emam (2015) “Bakery Owners Expect Produc-
tion  Slowdown in Eid over ‘Flour Shortage’,” Jordan Times 29 June, http://www.jordan 
times.com/news/local/bakery-owners-expect-production-slowdown-eid-over-flour 
-shortage%E2%80%99.
49  Finn Stepputat, (2013) “Contemporary Governscapes: Sovereign Practice and Hybrid Or-
ders Beyond the Center,” in Local Politics and Contemporary Transformations in the Arab 
World, ed., Malika Bouziane, Cilja Harders and Anja Hoffman (London: Palgrave Macmil-
lan, 2013), 31.
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one worker told me, “ma fesh ghayru” (there is no alternative).” I asked them to 
explain but they demurred, probably uneager to share their employer’s busi-
ness with an outsider whose presence they found puzzling. A month later, the 
routine still unchanged, I asked Hani about Fahed’s visits. “Al-daf‘a qabel al-
raf‘a (pay to play),”50 he stated jokingly, brushing my inquiry off. After work 
ended that evening, Hani asked me to stay and offered to discuss my query.
“As you can tell, we barely have enough bread for all our customers,” Hani 
relayed after a few pleasantries, “and this has only gotten worse over the past 
three years.” I nodded in agreement, as he went on to detail the various occa-
sions on which he had requested an increase in his flour quota from moits to 
no avail. “Every time they say no. We either do not have the baking capacity, 
or enough customers, or some other excuse,” he stressed. Hani then detailed 
how, for many of the neighborhood’s residents, survival or modest levels of 
subsistence would not be possible without the subsidized foodstuff they are 
able to purchase at his bakery, a reality that drove him to take the steps I had 
witnessed. He then expounded on the bribe itself, describing Fahed as an “old 
friend with a pure heart (qalbu abyad),” who understood “the situation,” as 
he lived in a nearby neighborhood. Irritated by the Ministry’s intransigence, 
which he traced to the neighborhood’s majority Palestinian population, sup-
port for Islamists and acute poverty, Hani had asked Fahed to arrange for sup-
plementary deliveries of subsidized flour. He purchases at black market rates 
that leave him minimal profits but ensure he has enough to stay open thirteen 
hours a day.51
Hani professes to run his business in accordance with Islamic prescrip-
tions, practicing commerce through a higher order of ethics characterized 
by modesty, thriftiness and abstention from superfluous profits. These traits 
were exemplified in his decision to pay higher wages to his workers and sell 
only  subsidized bread, made strictly from discounted flour. During lengthy 
workdays, he would often cite a hadith (prophetic saying): “He is not a believer 
whose stomach is filled while his neighbor goes hungry.” When describing his 
50  Literally, this phrase means to pay before you raise. What exactly is being raised is pur-
posely left ambiguous. This phrase is used in various idiomatic sayings. One is common 
to public protests, in which demonstrators request payment (symbolic, or in the way of 
a material transfer) before price increases. In the context in which it is uttered here, it 
is analogous to a common expression I heard used by single young men, in which you 
must pay (al-daf‘a) before (qabal) raising (al-raf‘a), a women’s skirt (often in reference to 
a prostitute). An alternative translation would be to pay in advance. I have chosen “pay to 
play,” as I feel it is the most accurate rendition in this context.
51 Most purchases of subsidized flour on the black market are destined to the production of 
sweets and biscuits with higher profit margins than standard khubz ‘arabī.
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business, he portrayed the bakery not simply as a workplace or profit source 
but as a sphere for moral yet effective economic purpose, a principled alterna-
tive to what he termed a nationally compromised state of affairs. Many local 
residents similarly described the bakery as a place somehow removed from the 
vicissitudes of the free market. “I feel safe at Hani’s,” one regular customer who 
I often conversed with explained, “The prices do not change. It is the one time 
in the day when I purchase something without pondering my budget or the 
difficulties of making ends meet.” His cousin Rashid, an employee at a nearby 
sandwich shop, similarly affirmed his attachments to place: “Hani makes mon-
ey,” he reasoned, “but his bakery is not a regular business, just concerned with 
profit. We all feel like it is fixed part of our hayy (neighborhood). The owner 
cares for the customers, who rely on his bread to live.”
Of course, Jabal B’s residents are aware of the broader socio-spatial strate-
gies that marginalize them; they are under no illusions about how or for whom 
the city works. Few of those I met had very radical positions, although many 
used religious ethics and modes of expression as a way to criticize an ostensibly 
rigged economic and political system seen to be led by corrupt elites.52 Their 
feelings of estrangement emerge from a sense that those in power work with a 
different set of values than their own, dedicated to profit-seeking capitalist op-
erations rather than the public needs of the city’s inhabitants. Yet when faced 
with the slow erosion of their livelihoods, they invoke a language of connec-
tion, sentimentality and mutual dependence, attached to a densely affective 
place. They describe the bakery, much like Hani, as a site of pragmatic materi-
ality, a node of nurturance that defies logics of “capital surplus absorption”53 
that increasingly prevail in Amman. While many residents knew of or could 
surmise the extent of black-market operations that made Hani’s bread-baking 
possible, his noble aims coupled with widespread suspicion of the government 
not only precluded disapproval but garnered praise amongst his customers.54 
52 While exploring the use of Islamic vocabularies is beyond the scope of this paper, various 
scholars have analyzed how religious frames are mobilized to critique prevailing politi-
cal and economic arrangements. Cihan Tuğal, “Transforming Everyday Life: Islamism and 
Social Movement Theory,” Theory and Society, 38:5 (2009): 423–458; Charles Tripp, Islam 
and the Moral Economy: The Challenge of Capitalism (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2006); Yael Navaro-Yashin (1998) “Entrapped Between Categories: ‘East’, ‘West’ and 
the Practices of Consumption of Turkish Islamists,” Sociologus 48:1 (1998): 1–16.
53 David Harvey, The Enigma of Capital, and the Crises of Capitalism (London: Profile Books, 
2010), 26.
54 Tacit knowledge of Hani’s weekly bribe resembles what Taussig describes as a “public se-
cret,” widely known but not spoken about publicly. Michael T. Taussig, Defacement: Public 
Secrecy and the Labor of the Negative (Palo Alto: Stanford University Press, 1999).
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A state of generalized corruption appeared to justify lesser illegalities. “We 
appreciate this place,” relayed one technician from a nearby garage who al-
ways purchased provisions for lunch, “We are thankful the owner does what 
he must to make our subsistence possible.” Hani’s success is judged neither by 
profit margins nor victories in a normative political sphere but rather by his 
deft management of what remains an extra-legal arrangement that, despite its 
criminalization, is not necessarily illegitimate.55
This baker’s business practices, especially his extensive opening hours and 
disinterest in engaging in other retail trades (sweets, expensive varieties of 
bread), are widely commended by local residents. Many described him as an 
exemplary business owner and generous man (rajul karīm). Yet to ensure his 
bakery’s success, Hani must cultivate social relations not only with Jabal B’s 
residents but also with ministry officials, negotiating fields of power as well 
as precise combinations of flour, water and salt. To do so, Hani asserts an ab-
stract right to subsistence while paying a bribe to ensure its fulfillment. He 
adheres to governmental regulations but with a crucial transgression. His bak-
ery exemplifies modes of economic action that evade the strict logics of the 
market while promoting an “ethics of care” for the community.56 His everyday 
practices signal alternative modes of exchange that must navigate governmen-
tal regulations in order to manipulate them, all while responding to moral 
concerns and physical needs. Of course, his self-recognized ability to circum-
vent regulations does not mean he has overcome the system or secured his 
long-terms interests in perpetuity. He remains open to harassment, enforced 
closure or onerous fines. What Hani’s business practices do illustrate is how 
the moits’s attempts to impose abstract spatial grids inevitably encounter an 
urban landscape entangled in social relations, urban livelihoods and moral 
economies. Hani’s purposeful navigation of government regulations, here 
seen in the unofficial purchase of subsidized flour from a ministry employee, 
and the world of relations that give meaning to these dynamics, constitute 
the terms by which Hani disrupts the state’s regulatory techniques without 
challenging its order outright. This is the limber terrain on which government 
interventions and welfare policies are worked out. While state strategies may 
work through fictions of fixity, they always struggle with the ambiguities of 
tactical micro-practices.
55 Jonathan Shapiro Anjaria, “Ordinary States: Everyday Corruption and the Politics of Space 
in Mumbai,” American Ethnologist 38:1 (2011): 67.
56 Moya Kneafsey et al., Reconnecting Consumers, Producers and Food: Exploring Alternatives 
(Oxford: Berg, 2008).
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 Jabal C: Sweetening Lives
Jabal C is a lower-middle class neighborhood near Amman’s historic city cen-
ter. It covers an area of 4 square kilometers and houses approximately 55,000 
residents. The quarter began as an extension of a nearby Palestinian refugee 
camp in the early 1950s, but has expanded steadily. It is now a bustling commer-
cial district. Local inhabitants work predominantly in the service sector. Small 
shopping malls, independent clothing shops, medical clinics, restaurants and 
other food purveyors are scattered throughout the neighborhood. While some 
families in the community are poor, most are lower or middle-class. Despite 
the disposable income and savings many possess, economic wellbeing is far 
from secure. Rising food and real estate prices are a source of constant worry 
and anxious conversation. I spent much of my time in Jabal C at al-Rīf, one of 
six bakeries in this sub-district of Amman. In addition to standard khubz ‘arabī, 
al-Rīf sold non-subsidized khubz ash-shrāk,57 a crucial ingredient the Jorda-
nian national feast dish mansaf,58 and an array of sweet biscuits (ka‘k) that are 
usually dipped in tea (see figure 1). The latter, which come in various shapes 
and flavours, sold very poorly, a constant source of frustration for the bakery’s 
owner. Confident of the quality of his ka‘k, he blamed dubious machinations at 
Samir’s, one of three nearby bakeries, for his bad luck.
After leaving work at al-Rīf, I would often wander around the neighbour-
hood, shop for household supplies or join friends for coffee. One day, my 
 curiosity piqued, I went to examine Samir’s baked goods. The reasons for his 
success selling biscuits quickly became apparent. Samir’s ka‘k cost, on average, 
around half the price of its equivalents at other bakeries. My sponsor at al-
Rīf, wholly unsurprised by my finding, explained how this drastic markdown 
was achieved. He surmised that Samir made private use of a public resource 
by concealing its subsidized origins. He did so by shrewdly mixing subsidized 
flour (al-Muwahhad), with the non-subsidized variety (zero) typically used 
for biscuits (see figures 2 and 3).59 As the former cost one-seventh the price, 
Samir could sell ka‘k at a dramatically lower price than his competitors while 
57 A large sheet of unleavened bread, it is far thinner and more difficult to prepare than 
khubz ‘arabī.
58 For more on mansaf, see Sally Howell, “Modernizing Mansaf: The Consuming Contexts of 
Jordan's National Dish,” Food & Foodways,11:4 (2003): 215–243.
59  Varieties of flour are distinguished by their extraction rate, the amount of bran and germ 
left in the flour after milling. Al-Muwahhad has a 78% extraction rate, while other variet-
ies typically lie somewhere between 55–68%.
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 retaining a considerable profit margin.60 Al-Rīf ’s owner accused Samir of 
“iḥtiyāl (fraud),” cheating both the government and his customers, who either 
could not tell the difference, or did not care given the price. His protestations to 
ministerial officials were frequent and heated. Partly due to such complaints, 
I was told that Samir’s bakery had been shut down on various occasions. Yet it 
always re-opened the next day, a product of his connections at the Ministry, 
al-Rīf ’s owner inferred. The story was more complicated.
I eventually met Samir through a common acquaintance at the Bakery Own-
er’s Association (boa).61 He proved a stark contrast to the scheming caricature 
described at al-Rīf. Exuberant and cheerful, his energy is infectious, a smile 
never too far from his face. His public self-presentation was that of a devout, 
God-fearing businessman, traits reflected in his place of business. His bakery 
was filled with Quranic suras, a sign behind his cash register read: “Ahemiyyat 
al-khubz yāti min al-Islām (The importance of bread comes from Islam).” The 
60  During most of 2013 subsidized flour cost Jordan’s bakers 35 dinars per ton ($49 usd), 
while the international market price hovered around 301.5 dinars ($426 usd).
61 The boa is the professional association charged with representing the interests of bakery 
owners in Jordan.
Figure 1 Varieties of ka‘k
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place was constantly bustling. Filled with customers throughout the day, he 
supplements retail transactions with a thriving wholesale trade with nearby 
hotels and restaurants. When explaining his success, Samir emphasized the 
social networks he had accumulated. He forges links with other merchants 
in activities such as raising money for local charities. On three separate eve-
nings during Ramadan, I witnessed Samir and his business associates organize 
Mawa’id al-rahman (tables of the Merciful), public banquets during which the 
poor are given food to break their fast, outside of his bakery. In addition to ac-
cumulating valuable symbolic capital, the social dimension of these acts helps 
Figure 2 Subsidized Flour (Muwahhad)
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develop ties between benefactors and recipients, which Samir would draw upon 
in key moments. Customers who I asked spoke of him highly, as did neighbour-
ing business owners, who appreciate the footfall his bakery generates. When I 
eventually asked him about his ka‘k prices, he was surprisingly forthcoming. 
Before 2008, flour was universally subsidized, he recounted  accurately, the 
Figure 3 Non-subsidized flour (Zero)
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new legislation caused a huge price rise in all wheat-based goods except khubz 
‘arabī.62 While Samir saw no reason why croissants or fancy baguettes should 
receive government support, ka‘k was different. “Cheap ka‘k to dip with tea is 
hardly a luxury,” he stressed, “Enjoying these little pleasures offers a moment 
of respite during the long workday, or a small indulgence for poor families who 
could afford little else.” And crucially, his customers agreed.
During my time living in Amman, Samir’s bakery was closed on two occa-
sions. Following complaints from anonymous members of the public, moits 
officials would arrive and inspect the extraction rate of various flour sacks 
and the quality of his baked goods. When inconsistencies were suspected, 
a moits official would meticulously catalogue their findings and take back 
samples to the head office for further inspection. After a weekly meeting at 
the Ministry in which violations were discussed, a committee would decree 
a temporary suspension in subsidized flour deliveries and issue a modest 
fine.63 Samir’s response to this government intervention is tactical. He shuts 
his shop the same afternoon the decision is issued and posts a placard outside 
his business blaming the Ministry for the bakery’s closure. That evening, he 
mobilizes his  networks for a protest. The following day, a crowd gathers on the 
street and sidewalks outside the bakery to the tune of various slogans revolv-
ing around bread. Hawkers, restaurants employees and off-duty construction 
workers in the vicinity were the main participants in the two protests I wit-
nessed. Police had been notified of the gathering ahead of time and casually 
stood amongst the protestors. I watched uncomfortably as Samir approached 
them. He listed his complaints and explained the reasons for the protest. His 
remarks emphasized bread’s importance to the community, how the penalties 
endangered local residents’ access to a key subsistence good: “Our survival is at 
stake (hayātuna ‘ala-l-miḥak)” and “our existence is in danger (istimrāriyatuna 
fi khatar)” were phrases he used repeatedly. Samir concluded by animating the 
crowd, which was now energetically waving loafs of bread.
To my surprise, the police were apathetic; two officers were holding back a 
smile. Notwithstanding the public spectacle, interactions with protestors were 
affable, even affectionate. The conversation that followed Samir’s remarks 
showed that their concern was not with the substance of his demands but with 
the logistics of the protest. Police officers explained that their job was to avoid 
62 Samir’s account is confirmed by various reports published at the time. For details on the 
2007 reform, see Ala al-Furwati (2007) “Darabka fi al-makāhbiz wa ghaḍab fi al-shāri‘a b‘ad 
raf‘a al-d‘am ‘an al-ṭaḥīn,” As-Sijil 2 (15 November), http://www.al-sijill.com/sijill_items/ 
sitem86.htm.
63 This information is based on thirty-four interviews with various employees of the Minis-
try of Industry, Trade and Supply, conducted between October 2013 and December 2015.
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traffic build-ups and violence amongst protestors. Much like the hawker pro-
tests Anjaria documents in Mumbai, remonstrations outside Samir’s bakery 
were “no dramatic challenge to authority but a cordial encounter.”64 This was 
neither a spontaneous expression of communal anger nor a typical opposi-
tion-led political rally, but a tactical medium used to communicate local griev-
ances. Samir did not seek to contest or de-legitimize the Hashemite regime, 
which he openly supports and praises, but to mobilize the state apparatus to 
serve particular ends.65
Once the press arrived, the gathering quickly dissipated. Demonstrators 
slowly dispersed and Samir huddled for a round of press interviews, some of 
which appeared in the nightly news or the next day’s newspaper. As Samir re-
counted, by seven or eight that evening he would receive a phone call from the 
liable Ministry official, who would duly inform him that the penalties imposed 
had been rescinded. “For the Ministry, it is not worth the bother,” he told me 
with a smile, “their job is to stay out of the news, they must have received twen-
ty angry phone calls from powerful people yesterday.” Knowing this, Samir cho-
reographed a protest to try and produce a desired outcome: he would notify 
the police, tipoff the press, who would make an appearance and transmit to 
the broader public the complaints aired in Jabal C. His success in having the 
fines annulled was not worked out in a juridical realm of rights or laws but in a 
domain grounded in everyday practices and relations.66 It is here, in this inter-
stice, that the legitimacy of counterfeit ka‘k is determined. Even though Samir’s 
ka‘k remains illegal, his tactical response to moits penalties produces extra-
legal recognitions of his baking practices. His success illustrates how navigat-
ing government regulations involves not only balancing extraction rates and 
subsidized flour quotas but proficiency in “negotiating dense networks of me-
diation” that include Ministry officials, elected politicians and reliable custom-
ers.67 The morning after the protest, Samir’s bakery was open and humming as 
usual. Governmental grids are always subject to tactical manipulations, forms 
of agency and inventiveness that make precarity livable.
I was struck by this event because of what it reveals about the possible 
kinds of engagements citizens have with state institutions. Through his astute 
64 Anjaria, The Slow Boil, 126.
65 Lisa Mitchell, “‘To stop train pull chain:’ Writing Histories of Contemporary Political 
 Practice,” Indian Economic & Social History Review 48:4 (2011): 469–495.
66 Anjaria “Ordinary States,” 85; AbdouMaliq Simone. City life from Jakarta to Dakar: 
 Movements at the Crossroads. London: Routledge, 2010.
67 Lisa Björkman, “The Ostentatious Crowd: Public Protest as Mass-Political Street Theatre 
in Mumbai,” Critique of Anthropology, 35:2 (2015): 142–165.
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and inventive use of crowd action, Samir marshals communal sentiments to 
 convey local grievances and potential unrest. Yet his manoeuvre, as well as 
the  protest outside his bakery, hardly qualifies as a straightforward moment 
of resistance. Far from contesting the legitimacy of the monarchy or the sov-
ereignty of state institutions, his actions recognize the latter’s authority, their 
ability to adjudicate subsidies and impose penalties. Samir strives instead to 
manage the state’s performative interventions. His primary concern is to shape 
the relationship between the strictures of the law and its application at the 
bakery. His success, and the “generalized informal functioning” of government 
programs it indicates does not mark a complete absence of rules or laws, nor 
that his practices are merely a matter of regulatory expertise and personal 
connection.68 On the contrary, Samir’s carefully choreographed social action 
is shaped by tacit codes and norms that he must carefully traverse. By making 
his claims on both practical and ethical grounds, Samir calls to account a state 
apparatus whose legitimacy partly rests on its commitment to “the people.”69 
While the criminalization of Samir’s business practices may seem to close off 
certain possibilities, his skilled use of local networks make discounted biscuit 
sales possible. By tactically manipulating a realm of ordinary activity, and cod-
ing his protest with political meanings, he defies governmental regulations in 
a fashion that is awkward for the Hashemite regime to suppress. In this regard, 
Jordan’s bakers do not navigate a political sphere of rights-bearing citizens or 
the rational machinery of an anonymous bureaucracy. They operate within a 
supple terrain of illegalities where success means neither revolution nor social 
upheaval but, as Samir put it, the ability to “sweeten [people’s] lives.”
Widely denounced by government officials as “fraud” that attenuates 
against the whole subsidy system, Hani’s Saturday routine and Samir’s use of 
crowd action are much more than a perversion of how the subsidized bread 
welfare program ought to work. While the payment of bribes and the selec-
tive enforcement of regulations point to the presence of a predatory state, 
 relationships and practices that emerge from such encounters also serve to 
open up possibilities. ‘Corruption’ here serves not only to alienate or disen-
franchise citizens. Informal arrangements and personal relationships between 
68 Giorgio Blundo and Jean-Pierre Olivier de Sardan, Everyday Corruption and the State: 
 Citizens and Public Officials in Africa (London: Zed Books, 2006), 5.
69  Diane Singerman, Avenues of Participation: Family, Politics, and Networks in Urban Quar-
ters of Cairo (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995), 14; Partha Chatterjee, The 
 Politics of the Governed: Reflections on Popular Politics in Most of the World (Columbia Uni-
versity Press, 2015); José Ciro Martínez, “Leavening Neoliberalization’s Uneven Pathways: 
Bread, Governance and Political Rationalities in the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan,” 
 Mediterranean Politics, 22:4 (2017): 464–483.
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low-level ministry employees and bakers enable substantive rights to bread to 
be negotiated and maintained, outside the proceduralist realm of the law.70 In 
the instances discussed herein, their interactions are not simply combative but 
collaborative;71 they involve moments of mediation where governmental grids 
and regulations are tactically manipulated. Such interactions make clear that 
policeman, ministerial employees, bakers, and ordinary citizens are not simply 
the autonomous agents of the state, business and society, but are likewise en-
tangled in ongoing relations of kinship, friendship and community that engulf 
the governmental grids that seek to carve them up. Reducing such exchanges 
to a normative breakdown of governance or a corruption of public programs 
overlooks the compromises, mediations and tensions that characterize the cit-
izenry’s everyday encounters with the state—a contingent formation whose 
apparent unity always condenses contradictions.72
 Conclusion: Agency in a Time of Constraints
Amman’s bakers epitomize many paradoxes: cherished providers, despised 
competitors, legitimized lawbreakers and precarious persistence. Their prac-
tices defy easy characterization and their relationship with state institutions 
is complex, characterized by predatory extortion, occasional collaboration, 
subtle negotiation and uneasy compromise. Or consider the bakery itself: 
while practices of planning see the bakery through the prism of abstract space: 
diagrams and statistics, all with objective properties, informal arrangements 
between low-level ministry officials and bakers reflect relational histories and 
subtle negotiations that occur in a shared social world.73 Despite clear differ-
ences in their formal relationships to structures of power and the hierarchies 
of class, gender and age that inflect their modes of interaction, certain forms 
of mediation and compromise are still possible. Systems of affinity are mul-
tiple and dense, few are unencumbered. This does not mean we should ide-
alize the bakery as a subaltern venue for service provision or as an  informal 
avenue of participation. Nor do I wish to posit practices at the bakery as co-
herent alternatives to the dominant order that can stand in somehow for 
70  Anjaria, The Slow Boil, p. 8.
71 Ortner, “Resistance and the Problem of Ethnographic Refusal,” 173–193.
72 Nicos Poulantzas, State, Power, Socialism (London: Verso, 1973); Akhil Gupta, Red Tape: 
Bureaucracy, Structural Violence and Poverty in India (Durham, nc: Duke University Press, 
2012), 108–109.
73 Anjaria, The Slow Boil, 18–19.
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radical ideological action.74 Indeed, I wish to warn against romanticizing the 
precarious  condition Samir and Hani’s bakeries inhabit. Their practices situ-
ate them outside the law, and both bakers frequently emphasized how contact 
with ministerial functionaries made their business hazardous and their liveli-
hoods insecure. In addition, other bakers are not necessarily as successful in 
negotiating the fine lines between pragmatism, necessity, resourcefulness and 
bribes. Some are caught between government regulations and informal norms, 
unable, unwilling or unsuccessful at traversing this volatile terrain. Others 
face selective enforcement, repeated closures and the relentless pressure of 
 ministerial prosecution.
Regardless of the vitality and pervasiveness of their efforts, both Samir and 
Hani went to great lengths to stress how the state apparatus maintains con-
trol over a basic subsistence good crucial to the citizenry, performing its power 
in the process.75 Of course, their efforts may ‘work back’ onto neoliberal and 
authoritarian logics, establishing limits on the penetration of the market and 
 bureaucratic girds while demonstrating what alternative economic practices 
may look like.76 Yet at the same time, tacit toleration of such activities may 
help prevent broad-based protest and social unrest. This is why de Certeau 
emphasizes the flagrant ambivalence of tactics, they can be both “expan-
sively inclusive and oppressively exclusive,” and need not come in emanci-
patory forms.77 What is clear, however, is that state interventions are always 
 incomplete,  unfinished projects, as the calculative practices of government 
allow for unforeseen reconfigurations. Dichotomies of domination/resistance, 
state/society and legality/illegality cannot fully capture the contingencies of 
everyday practice.
74 For more on the pragmatism-radicalism dialectic in the study of local politics which 
informs these two interpretations, see Paul Amar, “Beyond the ‘Pragmatism-Radicalism 
Dialectic’ in the Study of Local Politics,” in Local Politics and Contemporary Transforma-
tions in the Arab World, ed. Malika Bouziane, Cilja Harders and Anja Hoffman (London: 
Palgrave Macmillan, 2013), 65–90.
75 For more on how the provision of bread can function as a crucial performance of state 
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The payment of bribes to ensure subsidized flour, the stubborn use of 
crowd action to safeguard illegal sweets are not oriented against an abstract 
authoritarian regime or a unitary state, but are far more situated—enmeshed 
in  “contingent constellations of practice, milieu and materiality.”78 Born of 
necessity and perpetuated by cooperation and compromise, these practices 
 allow bakers to transform peripheral places within the urban landscape into 
arenas in which they can negotiate for services, ensure subsistence and main-
tain cohesive communities. Similar actions at any one of Amman’s 478 baker-
ies illustrate forms of agency that neither escape the state’s categories nor its 
constraints, but engage state power within the field in which it is exercised. De 
Certeau’s concept of “tactics” is useful in this respect, as it offers a less loaded 
view of people’s reluctance, refusal and negotiation in the face of power. It 
offers a more ambiguous, less decisive, less ideologically driven lens through 
which to analyse the many ways citizens inhabit their subordination. Samir 
and Hani’s actions are less about rebellion than calculated re-appropriation, 
the cultivation of modes of togetherness and alternative forms of exchange 
that make precarity and inter-dependence livable. As Mahmood argues, “While 
acts of resistance to relations of domination constitute one modality of action, 
they certainly do not exhaust the field of human action.”79 That is to say, agen-
tic capacity is not only operative in those practices that contest domination 
but also in the various ways people inhabit power.80 Yet far too often, we define 
political agency restrictively, as an active stance of defiance against domina-
tion that takes places within a demarcated public sphere or an intentionally 
concealed form of resistance to hegemonic norms. In doing so, we not only 
foreclose  certain questions about the workings of power,81 but impose norms 
of hypervisibility and liberal politics on peoples who have different ways of 
making community and warding off control.82 To grasp this is to  recognize 
the conundrums of those who live and labor in authoritarian  settings and 
 appreciate the vast political terrain that lies between quiescence and revolt. 
It is also to embed the politics of place in everyday life, not as simple sites of 
subaltern resistance nor as part of a governmental apparatus of acquiescence. 
In the Hashemite Kingdom, Amman’s bakeries are so much more.
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